Pursuing claims in the era of sanctions. Will the CJEU change the position of creditors?

Polski · English

Asset freezing, the prohibition on satisfying claims and limitation periods under European Union law and the case law of national courts.

Can a creditor successfully pursue payment in court when one of the parties is subject to economic sanctions? Should the court dismiss the action even if the claim is entirely well founded, or can it order payment and stay enforcement of the judgment until the sanctions are lifted? And if the limitation period continues to run, could assets remaining frozen for many years ultimately result in the loss of the claim?

These questions are particularly significant given the extensive system of European Union economic sanctions. They concern not only Russian businesses, but also banks, investors, trading partners, football clubs, and individuals and entities that are not themselves directly subject to sanctions but have legal relationships with sanctioned parties.

The issue goes beyond whether a bank transfer can be made. Sanctions may also affect proceedings on the merits, the availability of interim measures to secure a claim, the enforcement of arbitral awards and the running of limitation periods.

Two provisions of Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 are particularly important: Articles 2 and 11. Although both seek to ensure the effectiveness of sanctions, their scope and legal consequences differ.

Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014: freezing funds and prohibiting their provision

Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014 imposes two principal obligations.

The first, under paragraph 1, requires the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by individuals and entities subject to sanctions.

The second, under paragraph 2, prohibits making funds and economic resources available to those parties, directly or indirectly.

Freezing is a much broader concept than blocking a bank account. It includes prohibiting legal transactions that could change the legal status, purpose or possible use of frozen assets.

From a civil-law perspective, however, freezing assets is not the same as confiscating them. It does not automatically transfer ownership to the state or extinguish civil-law obligations.

If a creditor has a payment claim against a sanctioned person, the application of Article 2 does not, in itself, mean that the debt ceases to exist.

A creditor may therefore hold a claim that is fully due and payable and has been confirmed by a final judgment, yet still be unable to obtain satisfaction from the debtor’s frozen assets.

The position is similar where it is the creditor who is subject to sanctions. Being included on a sanctions list does not automatically prohibit bringing court proceedings to recover a debt, although payment and the use of any funds received are subject to specific restrictions.

The exceptions provided for in the Regulation must also be borne in mind. Articles 5 and 6 allow the competent authority, in certain circumstances, to authorise the release of frozen assets. Article 7, in turn, governs the crediting of certain payments to frozen accounts, provided that the funds remain frozen.

It cannot therefore be assumed that every payment involving a sanctioned party is invariably prohibited.

Article 11: the prohibition on satisfying claims goes much further

Article 11 of Regulation No 269/2014, commonly described as the no-claims clause, is different in nature. It provides that certain claims arising from contracts and transactions whose performance has been affected by the restrictive measures imposed by the Regulation must not be satisfied. The key wording is that no claims shall be satisfied.

This is more than a technical restriction on making payments. The provision also protects contracting parties that comply with sanctions law against the adverse consequences of refusing to perform obligations prohibited by EU law. Article 11 has a broad scope. It covers, among other things, claims for contractual performance, including delivery of goods or provision of services; payment of the price or another principal sum under a contract whose performance has been prevented by sanctions; compensation from an EU party as a result of sanctions; claims under bank guarantees, insurance guarantees or letters of credit; counterclaims, including set-off raised by sanctioned parties; and applications for recognition or enforcement of court judgments and arbitral awards.

Who falls within Article 11?

For this provision to apply, it is not enough to establish that a party to the contract is a Russian business. Under Article 11(1), the prohibition applies to certain claims brought by individuals and entities listed in Annex I and by persons acting through or on behalf of them. In the version of the Regulation incorporating the amendments applicable in 2026, point (c) was also added. It covers the category specified in that provision of individuals and entities from third countries, excluding certain partner countries, that make funds or resources available in breach of the Regulation.

Article 11(2) also contains a special rule on the burden of proof. In proceedings seeking satisfaction of a claim, the party pursuing the claim must prove that satisfying it is not prohibited.

At the same time, paragraph 3 preserves the right to judicial review of the legality of non-performance of contractual obligations. This raises a fundamental question: if a creditor may bring an action, but the court must not allow a particular claim to be satisfied, what should the outcome be? Should the court dismiss the action because of sanctions, even where the claim is well founded?

Dutch and Lithuanian courts have dismissed claims because of sanctions. Will the Advocate General’s Opinion and the forthcoming CJEU judgment change the case law?

The practice of courts in EU Member States shows that Article 11 of the sanctions regulations, which establishes the no-claims clause, can provide an independent basis for dismissing an action. This also applies where the existence of the obligation is undisputed or the court accepts that the claim is well founded under civil law.

The question therefore arises whether the position taken by Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus in his Opinion of 4 September 2025 in Case C-480/24, Čiekuri-Shishki, signals a fundamental change in the approach to such disputes.

The Amsterdam court: dismissal of a claim for repayment of advance payments

On 15 January 2025, the Amsterdam District Court delivered its judgment in Case ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:342, concerning claims brought by the Cypriot company Techisle Trading Ltd, formerly Isolin Trade and Invest Ltd, against NetApp Ireland Limited and NetApp B.V.

The dispute arose from distribution agreements for IT products and services intended for Russian customers. The Cypriot company sought repayment of amounts paid in advance for supplies whose performance had been affected by sanctions imposed on Russia. The court applied Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014. In paragraph 4.3 of its reasoning, it held that even if rescission or termination of the agreements had created a civil-law obligation to return the payments received, the claimant’s claims could not be upheld because of the sanctions provisions. In paragraph 4.10, the court emphasised the broad meaning of a claim under Article 11, finding that it also covered restitutionary claims for repayment of amounts previously paid. In paragraphs 4.13–4.15, it found that the Cypriot company acted in the interests of Russian end users and trading intermediaries. Satisfying its claim could ultimately benefit Russian parties falling within Article 11(1)(b) of Regulation No 833/2014.

The court therefore held that the claimant fell within Article 11(1)(c) as a party acting on behalf of specified Russian parties. It also refused declaratory relief, finding that the claimant had no independent interest in obtaining such a declaration where its sole purpose would be to pursue the prohibited repayment. Nor did it permit sanctions to be circumvented by relying on unjust enrichment.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the action in its entirety and ordered the claimant to pay the costs.

Amsterdam District Court judgment of 15 January 2025, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:342 — automatic English translation. This is a machine translation, not an official English version; the Dutch original remains authoritative.

The Supreme Court of Lithuania: refusal to award an undisputed debt

An even more interesting decision was delivered on 27 June 2024 by the Supreme Court of Lithuania in Case e3K-3-139-701/2024, Vydmantai wind park v Elektrum Lietuva.

The dispute concerned claims under an electricity sale agreement. The claimant company sought, among other things, payment for electricity supplied. However, links were established between it and an entity controlled by a person subject to economic sanctions. The Supreme Court of Lithuania held that Article 11 of Regulation No 269/2014 precluded granting the claim for payment for electricity supplied while the relevant restrictions were in force and dismissed the action.

Supreme Court of Lithuania decision of 27 June 2024, e3K-3-139-701/2024 — automatic English translation. This is a machine translation, not an official English version; the Lithuanian original remains authoritative.

A turning point in the case law

The Latvian case, C-480/24 Čiekuri-Shishki: a loan repayment was awarded, and the sanctions issue then arose

Case C-480/24, involving two Latvian companies, Čiekuri-Shishki SIA and Country Heli SIA, is particularly significant in this context.

On 19 May 2015, the parties entered into a loan agreement for EUR 3,407,347.10. The borrower failed to repay the funds, and on 19 January 2023 the creditor brought an action for the principal and interest. On 13 September 2023, the district court in Riga upheld the action and ordered payment. The judgment became final on 4 October 2023, after which an enforcement instrument was issued.

The difficulty lay in the defendant company’s ownership structure. The claimant held half of the shares in Country Heli. The other 50% belonged to the Cypriot company Abacus (Cyprus) Limited, whose beneficial owner was an individual subject to EU sanctions. The first-instance court had not examined whether those links were relevant to the application of Regulation No 269/2014. The acting Prosecutor General challenged the judgment, referring to the possibility of circumventing sanctions. The case consequently came before the Latvian Supreme Court, which stayed enforcement of the contested judgment on 8 February 2024 and subsequently referred questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.

It should be emphasised that the claimant was not automatically treated as a sanctioned entity. Rather, ownership links relating to the defendant were identified that could require further examination. This mattered because Articles 2 and 11 do not have identical scopes. The mere fact that shares are held by an entity linked to a sanctioned person does not establish that every transaction and every claim within that structure is prohibited.

The case raised several legal issues: the court’s duty to examine sanctions of its own motion, the significance of ownership links, the effects of a judgment ordering payment, and the possibility of restricting its enforceability.

Advocate General Norkus’s Opinion: can a court uphold a claim and stay enforcement of the judgment?

On 4 September 2025, Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus delivered his Opinion in Case C-480/24. It is one of the most significant analyses of the procedural effects of economic sanctions, as it seeks to explain the relationship between the EU prohibition on satisfying claims and the right of access to a court.

The court’s duty to examine sanctions of its own motion: paragraphs 50–60

The Advocate General considered that a national court should examine of its own motion whether Articles 2 and 11 of the Regulation apply to the parties where there are indications that they may do so. This does not require an unlimited investigation in every civil case. However, where the circumstances suggest links to sanctioned persons, the court should not remain passive. It may use its procedural powers and request information from the competent public authorities.

Consequently, even if the defendant does not raise a sanctions defence, the court may still be required to examine whether its judgment would comply with EU law.

The primacy of EU law and contractual performance: paragraphs 65–70

The next part of the Opinion examines the effects of sanctions on civil-law obligations. The Advocate General explains that the primacy of EU law effectively suspends performance of contractual obligations to the extent that performance would breach the applicable sanctions. This does not automatically invalidate the entire contract. He distinguishes temporary inability to perform an obligation from the continued existence of contractual rights. This is also relevant to Article 11, which protects a contracting party against claims arising from non-performance caused by compliance with sanctions.

The key interpretation: paragraphs 71–79

Here, Norkus directly addresses whether Article 11 prohibits a court from examining a claim on its merits. He explains that the Regulation does not harmonise Member States’ civil procedure in detail. National law therefore determines the procedural instruments for implementing sanctions obligations, while ensuring their effectiveness. In paragraph 74, he states that a court must prevent satisfaction of a claim covered by Article 11.

In paragraph 75, however, he accepts an approach under which the court examines the merits of the claim and includes a clause in the operative part of its judgment preventing enforcement for as long as the relevant prohibition remains in force.

In paragraphs 76 and 77, the Advocate General also distinguishes claims covered by the prohibition from claims whose performance has not been affected by sanctions. The latter may be upheld even where they are brought by a person on a sanctions list.

He also notes that proceedings may be stayed where the applicable procedural law provides for this.

The Opinion therefore suggests that Article 11 should not be interpreted as automatically prohibiting examination of the merits. What matters is that the judgment must not produce an outcome contrary to sanctions.

Does it matter who is the claimant and who is the defendant? Paragraphs 80–86

The Advocate General also emphasises that Article 11 concerns the particular claim, rather than merely the parties’ formal designation in the proceedings.

A sanctioned person may be a defendant while also advancing a claim of their own, for example through a counterclaim or a set-off defence. It is therefore not enough simply to state that the claimant is not on a sanctions list or that the defendant is linked to a sanctioned entity. It is necessary to establish who holds the particular claim, who would benefit from its satisfaction, and whether upholding it would infringe the relevant prohibition.

As at 31 October 2026, proceedings in Case C-480/24 remained pending. The Advocate General’s position nevertheless points towards an important interpretation: the existence of a claim does not necessarily mean that it can currently be satisfied, while an inability to satisfy it does not necessarily require a refusal to examine the case or automatic dismissal of the action.

Does Article 11 require dismissal of an action?

This issue continues to raise significant procedural doubts. Where only Article 2 applies, freezing assets does not, as a rule, in itself justify dismissing an action for payment.

The position under Article 11 is different. Where a claim is subject to a prohibition on satisfaction, the court cannot issue a ruling that would circumvent that prohibition. This does not mean, however, that every such case must end in dismissal.

The available solutions depend on procedural law and the relief sought. It is necessary to consider whether the court may declare that the debt exists, order payment while staying enforcement, or stay the proceedings themselves.

Sanctions do not always make payment impossible

A proper assessment must also consider whether the obligation can lawfully be performed despite sanctions. Article 7 of Regulation No 269/2014 provides for circumstances in which funds may be credited to a sanctioned person’s frozen account, provided that they remain frozen. In certain situations, this enables the debtor to perform the obligation without breaching the prohibition on making funds freely available.

This does not, however, disapply all other prohibitions in the Regulation, particularly Article 11.

Each case therefore requires a separate assessment of whether the obstacle concerns an actual inability to perform, merely restrictions on the free use of funds received, or a prohibition on satisfying a particular type of claim.

A further issue: arbitral awards under Article 11

The Opinion delivered by Advocate General Andrea Biondi on 26 February 2026 in Case C-802/24, Reibel, also deserves particular attention.

The case concerned a contract between a Belgian business and the Russian company Stankoimport. Delivery was affected by sanctions and the refusal of an export licence. The Russian contracting party sought repayment of its advance payment with interest. The dispute went to arbitration, resulting in an award in favour of the Russian company. The Advocate General examined Article 11 of Regulation No 833/2014, a separate sanctions instrument with a different personal and substantive scope from Regulation No 269/2014.

He considered that the prohibition on satisfying certain claims should be treated as part of EU public policy, subject to review also when national courts examine arbitral awards.

The Opinion confirms the importance of asking whether obtaining a judgment or arbitral award is, in itself, sufficient to protect a claim effectively when its satisfaction remains prohibited.

As at 31 October 2026, Case C-802/24 had likewise not yet been decided by a CJEU judgment.

Does the current sanctions system adequately protect creditors?

The case law discussed above makes clear that three stages must be distinguished: the claim arising and becoming due, obtaining a judicial decision, and actual satisfaction.

Different restrictions may apply at each stage.

In my view, it is particularly important that an inability to enforce a judgment does not always mean that it cannot be obtained, and the right to bring an action is not the same as the right to have the claim satisfied.

Advocate General Norkus’s Opinion identifies the possibility of examining a claim on its merits and even ordering payment while staying enforcement for the duration of sanctions. It does not, however, conclusively establish whether that solution is available in every national procedural system. This is why many businesses await the CJEU’s judgments in the cases discussed above.

Conclusion

EU economic sanctions do not automatically extinguish civil-law obligations. They may, however, substantially restrict performance, the pursuit of particular claims and enforcement proceedings.

Article 2 of Regulation No 269/2014 focuses on freezing assets and prohibiting the provision of funds and economic resources. Article 11 establishes a separate prohibition on satisfying certain claims relating to contracts and transactions whose performance has been affected by sanctions.

In these circumstances, particular importance attaches to limitation periods, the possibility of interrupting them, statutory interest for late payment and the scope of judicial protection of existing claims. Questions arise as to whether sanctions should be treated as force majeure or as supervening impossibility of performance within the meaning of Article 475 of the Polish Civil Code.

The relationship between the prohibition on satisfying claims and effective protection of creditors remains one of the most important legal issues in the contemporary sanctions system.

Barbara Kardynia, Advocate

Legislation and case law

1. Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — consolidated text of 28 September 2026: Articles 1, 2, 5–7, 10 and 11.

2. Opinion of Advocate General Rimvydas Norkus of 4 September 2025, C-480/24, Čiekuri-Shishki: in particular, paragraphs 50–60 and 65–87.

3. Request for a preliminary ruling in Case C-480/24: questions referred by the Latvian Supreme Court.

4. CJEU judgment of 11 November 2021, C-340/20, Bank Sepah: restrictions on interim measures and enforcement against frozen assets.

5. Opinion of Advocate General Andrea Biondi of 26 February 2026, C-802/24, Reibel: the prohibition on satisfying claims and review of arbitral awards.

6. Rome I Regulation, No 593/2008: Article 12(1)(d), concerning the law applicable to limitation of contractual obligations.

7. Polish Civil Code: Articles 121, 123, 124 and 125, concerning suspension, interruption and limitation periods.